

VICTORY FOR THE FORESTS: GREENPEACE'S MARKET CAMPAIGN FOR THE GREAT BEAR RAINFOREST

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The government is to announce a historic, land-use agreement today, banning logging in selected areas of the Great Bear Rainforest. The announcement is a victory for environmentalists who have staged campaigns over logging in the ancient forests and international boycotts of Great Bear wood. (*Globe and Mail, April 4, 2001*)

This statement, in a lead article in a Toronto newspaper, chronicled a major moment in the forest campaign waged in the marketplace for over 7 years by environmentalists in British Columbia (B.C.) and around the world. Over that period, many industrial consumers of forest products had voiced strong concerns over the practices of B.C. logging companies, had cancelled contracts with the B.C. suppliers, and had changed their own company policies to phase out the use of wood from endangered forests, in particular from B.C. temperate rainforests. In addition, British and Canadian investment and mutual fund managers had divested shares in one of the logging companies, Interfor, or had used their shares to raise serious questions to Interfor about its forest practices.

Greenpeace's news release of the same date listed some of the companies that had made changes:

These include Home Depot (the world's largest "Do It Yourself" store) and powerful pulp buyers such as the German paper and magazine association. Companies such as England's Amdega (one of the world's largest conservatory manufacturers), Auspine (Australian timber importer), the Italian supermarket chain Coop, the Belgian Timber Trade Federation (representing Belgian timber importers) and other companies in New Zealand, China and The Netherlands have all recently ceased buying products derived from Interfor. In Japan alone more than 70 companies including Mitsubishi and Fujiya have now made a commitment to stop buying products from Interfor.

While environmentalists claimed a significant first step towards victory for the forests, government and forestry officials saw the agreement mainly as the end of an international campaign that had significantly affected their ability to sell wood products from the endangered temperate rainforests of British Columbia. The government's Environment Minister, Ian Waddell, said that the agreement would have "enormous implications internationally, because it gives us a selling point in Europe" (*Globe and Mail, April 4, 2001*). The Vancouver Sun, in its full-page coverage on April 5, 2001, said the "agreement will dramatically improve the image of the forest companies on the world stage." In an article entitled, "Forest firms expect the role of hero will cost them," Gordon Hamilton wrote:

"Forest companies said they agreed to the deal because it ended the highly damaging environmental campaign that targeted their international customers and launched them into a new eco-friendly international image."

So how did this all happen?

This paper describes how Greenpeace's market campaign brought about the protection of 20 critical pristine (meaning less than 2% of the overall watershed has been impacted) valleys in Canada's Great Bear Rainforest, as well as major reforms to end destructive logging practices in this threatened forest. It explores the various strategies used to achieve the end objective of seeking a phase-out of industrial logging in the old-growth rainforests, and a shift toward logging in second-growth forests according to ecological principles.

It is important to note that Greenpeace did not engage in this campaign alone. It worked in strategic alliances with a number of other local, regional, national, and international environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOS), whose work contributed significantly to the success of the campaign. It collaborated with scientists, foresters, authors, musicians, artists, photographers, lawyers, and communications specialists, as well as with thousands of global citizens to make this campaign work.

Greenpeace's position as a global environmental campaigning organization with a presence in 41 countries positioned it to play a unique role in international markets for wood products. Its independence from receiving funding from any government, corporation, or political party provided it with a platform from which to conduct independent scientific and market research. Its high public profile and international recognition as a fearless and non-violent defender of the environment enabled it to ignite public interest and outrage about the destructive forest practices in B.C.'s temperate rainforests. And finally, its ability to travel into inaccessible areas of coastal forests with its ships and communications equipment facilitated the dissemination of images of forest destruction around the world.

Setting the Stage

The temperate rainforest of Canada stretches along the western edge of B.C. and nestles between the mountains and the sea. Originally blanketing 6.5 million hectares of land and extending as much as 150 kilometres inland, more than half of the original ancient rainforest has been logged or cleared (Sierra Club of British Columbia, 1997). On a global scale, half of the world's temperate rainforests have been destroyed and one quarter of what remains is in B.C. (Bryant, Nielsen and Tangle, 1997). The area is home to rare flora and fauna that are dependent on the temperate rainforest ecosystem. Many scientists claim that we really do not yet know all the species that exist there, but affirm that the value of this temperate rainforest to the globe is immeasurable (Greenpeace Canada, 1997).

For years the preferred method of industrial logging in this rainforest has been clearcutting. This practice of cutting down every tree in a large area is particularly devastating in the fragile temperate rainforest, resulting in the destruction of the forest ecosystem on which so many plants and animals depend. Recent investigations (Sierra Legal Defence Fund, 1996) have shown that 97% of all the logging in the temperate rainforest is done by clearcutting. By the government's own statistics, the rate of timber cut in the province has exceeded Long-Term Harvest Levels for 19 of the last 20 years (Greenpeace Canada, 1998a, p. 5). This set the stage for a lengthy environmental campaign to stop this destructive forest practice and to save the remaining pristine ancient forests.

The Valley-By-Valley Approach

During the 1980s and early 1990s local and regional environmentalists challenged the clearcutting of these forests, principally through a valley-by-valley approach. They blockaded the roads into the forests, prohibiting logging trucks from passing. Their determination and in-depth knowledge of the forests they were trying to protect spurred them to confront the logging companies on numerous occasions. Legal injunctions obtained through the courts enabled the companies to have the protestors arrested for contempt of court. In spite of this, the protestors increasingly gained public support and were successful in their push to save several rainforest valleys. (The decisions to preserve the Walbran and Carmanah Valleys are examples of this.)

It was a clear victory when a valley was designated as a park or conservation area. However, each valley struggle involved a huge amount of work and took a long time. While the battle was being waged over one valley, cutting would be continuing elsewhere. The conservation of one valley at a time was problematic in the larger ecological sense — habitat, forest ecology, watershed management, salmon protection, and climate change. Saving one valley at a time would not address all of these major issues.

In addition, the matter of land ownership in these valleys was unresolved. The First Nations said it was their land; lacking written treaties, they insisted that their historic occupation and right to the land must be recognized. The government called it *Crown Land*, meaning it belonged to the government and therefore it was a government decision about who could be granted licenses to take timber from the land. The granting of tree farm licenses and the collection of stumpage fees from the logging companies who held these licenses provided revenue for the government and a source of jobs in the province. There was practically nothing for the people who laid claim to the land, either in terms of jobs or income from the extraction of their resources.

Clayoquot Sound

By 1993 the struggle that the Friends of Clayoquot Sound (FOCS) had started during the 1980s to save Clayoquot Sound on the west coast of Vancouver Island had catalyzed into a major environmental push, a “war in the woods.” Together with other ENGOs including Greenpeace, FOCS launched a public appeal to people across Canada to come to Clayoquot Sound and join the protests.

The response was overwhelming. Every day for almost five months, people blockaded the logging road operated by forestry giant, MacMillan Bloedel, at times keeping them from proceeding into the forests. The Australian band Midnight Oil accepted Greenpeace’s invitation to perform a concert at the site where logging trucks enter the cutting zone. On that day in July 1993, over 6,000 people crowded into the area, bringing all work to a halt. National media picked up these stories from the “front line,” and Clayoquot Sound became a household name in Canada.

Response from MacMillan Bloedel. MacMillan Bloedel did what it had already been doing in the B.C. forests. It went to the court and obtained injunction orders, citing those who would not get off the road with contempt of court. During that summer over 800 Canadians were arrested in Clayoquot Sound under this injunction order, which the court had expanded to include all people under a *Jane and John Doe* clause. These arrests constituted one of the

largest mass arrests of non-violent demonstrators in Canadian history, and included grandmothers, children, students, and professionals from various walks of life and from many provinces. The court cases went on for months, resulting in a range of judgments (depending on which judge was hearing the case) from suspended sentences to 45 days in prison to electronic monitoring for a designated period of time.

Meanwhile in Clayoquot Sound, MacMillan Bloedel continued its clearcutting.

Response from the Government of British Columbia. In November 1993, the B.C. government unveiled its Forest Practices Code, spelling out what the government called “dramatic changes” in the way logging would be done and forests would be managed in B.C. The Premier, Michael Harcourt, said at the unveiling, “Until now the attitude has been that the forests were there to be exploited. Those days are over” (Vancouver Sun, November 10, 1993).

At the same time, the government launched a multi-million dollar public relations campaign to promote the Code at home and abroad. In a later report entitled *Broken Promises*, produced in the spring of 1997, Greenpeace documented the extent to which this campaign and others conducted by the Canadian government and the forest industry went to promote a positive image of their forest practices. “During the 1990s, Canadian federal and provincial governments, in partnership with three forest industry lobby groups, have together spent at least \$68.7 million to tell the world of the ‘sustainable forest practices’ underway at home.” (Greenpeace International, 1997, p. 20).

Response from Greenpeace. Meanwhile, Greenpeace was staging a blockade of MacMillan Bloedel’s logging road in Clayoquot Sound. Eight protestors were arrested and charged with contempt of court. The difference this time was that the people arrested came from six different countries — Austria, Netherlands, Germany, UK, USA, and Canada. The story was picked up in all of the countries represented, and the public beyond Canada began to take notice. This signalled a key shift in campaign strategy. The campaign was moving beyond Canadian borders. Greenpeace International, at the urging of Greenpeace Canada, agreed to give the campaign a priority push within the entire organization “for a few months.”

Upping the Ante: From the Valleys to the Marketplace

It was clear that stopping clearcutting in a few valleys was not enough. Fundamental changes had to occur throughout the entire forest industry. Greenpeace’s forest campaign team analyzed the power structures at work in the B.C. forests, identifying those who had the power and thus the responsibility to act. Its ongoing research throughout the years of the campaign was vital in enabling it to unravel the interconnections between the industry and government, the industry and workers, the industry and First Nations, the government and First Nations, the producers and consumers, and the public and the forests. Greenpeace developed the position that if the temperate rainforest in B.C. was to be spared this “chainsaw massacre,” there must be a campaign in the international marketplace where wood from B.C. is sold and consumed. With a view to waging campaigns in both producer and consumer countries, Greenpeace planned to expose the links between consumer demand and forest destruction.

This strategy meant that the campaign would move beyond individual valleys to include the entire temperate rainforest, beyond one forest company to the entire industry, beyond the confines of B.C. into the international marketplace. Various stages would be necessary to make this work.

Vilifying the Practice: The Chainsaw Massacre

The first stage of the market strategy began in 1994 in the European marketplace where Greenpeace showed images of the clearcut forest areas of B.C. to its supporters, as well as to the industrial consumers of B.C. wood products produced by MacMillan Bloedel. The images were shocking — vast denuded areas, eroded mountainsides, destroyed streambeds, huge stumps of once thriving 1,000-year-old cedar trees. They evoked an immediate response. A veritable mountain of postcards from German consumers were sent to Michael Harcourt, the Premier of B.C., calling on him to use his power to “stop the chop” in his province. The postcards informed him that as consumers they would demand products from their wood suppliers that did not come from areas such as those portrayed in the pictures they had seen. They did just that, and the companies began asking questions of their B.C. suppliers. The war in the marketplace had begun.

The Friends of Clayoquot Sound (FOCS) toured across Canada and Europe with “Stumpy,” an enormous stump of a felled 1,000-year-old tree. The size of the stump, accompanied by a FOCS audio-visual show and talk, gave credence to what was happening in the forest.

Throughout the entire seven-year market campaign, images of fresh clearcutting in old-growth forests in B.C. provided the strongest motivations for actions by industrial consumers.

Response from the B.C. Government: “Come and see for yourselves.” When the B.C. Premier travelled to Europe in 1994 to assure European industrial consumers of the new approach to forestry in his province, Greenpeace trailed him everywhere he went, raising questions from its research. In the same year the B.C. government bought shares in MacMillan Bloedel!

In subsequent years, the government invited business people, European parliamentarians, scientists, and academics to “come and see the B.C. forests for yourselves.” According to figures obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, in addition to these government-sponsored, taxpayer-funded tours, “in 1996 alone, the B.C. government played host to 33 other international tours by forestry-related delegations” (Greenpeace International, 1997, p. 22).

Response from the Canadian Government: “We are committed to the environment.”

Concerned about the effects of the environmental campaign on the market for forest products from Canada, the Standing Committee on Natural Resources of the Canadian House of Commons held special hearings on clearcutting and invited forest industry representatives, conservation biologists, small woodlot owners, environmentalists, and ecoforesters to appear before it. Its final conclusions were heavily supportive of the practice of clearcutting and highly critical of the analysis of the environmental groups.

As the international campaign strengthened over the following years, the Canadian government gave extensive briefings to its embassy officials in countries where Greenpeace

was staging public demonstrations about the “chainsaw massacre” in B.C. Again a large amount of money from the federal government went to pay for a public relations campaign on Canada’s commitment to the environment and B.C.’s “world-class” forestry practices.

Response from Greenpeace. Greenpeace waged its own “guerrilla” ad campaign in 1994 with posters and billboards throughout Vancouver, the business capital of the province. The campaign focused on the government’s economic interests in the logging companies (especially the government’s recent purchase of shares in MacMillan Bloedel); the stiff penalties handed out to protestors in the forests; and the likelihood that clearcutting would lead to the same disastrous end for the forests as “clearcutting” the cod fishery did on Canada’s east coast (i.e. the depletion of the resource and closure of the industry). The campaign itself became a media story, providing Greenpeace with a lot of good public relations without having to pay for it.

Greenpeace offered an alternative tour to many of the same people the government had reached, showing them the vast clearcuts, as well as the pristine forests. When confronted with this visual juxtaposition, many doubters of Greenpeace’s message became convinced that the destruction of the forests really was occurring.

The public relations war and the increasing pressure on Greenpeace meant that it had to re-commit itself to this particular campaign, which it did in 1996 by declaring that this would be a priority campaign for the entire organization.

Vilifying the Perpetrators: The Chainsaw Wielders

MacMillan Bloedel

Greenpeace’s initial strategy called for a focus on the largest logging company in British Columbia, MacMillan Bloedel. Greenpeace’s research pointed to significant violations by MacMillan Bloedel of provincial and federal forestry and fishing regulations, to continuing clearcutting in Clayoquot Sound, and to plans to log some of the last large intact valleys in B.C.’s temperate rainforest within the coming five years. Greenpeace also discovered that MacMillan Bloedel faced a court challenge from the First Nations people of Haida Gwaii in northwest B.C., who claimed that its license to log in Haida traditional territory was illegal under the B.C. Forest Act.

The strategy regarding Clayoquot Sound was to keep the heat on MacMillan Bloedel and the government of B.C. through various direct actions in the forest, while continuing to be open to negotiations. There was strong public support for this work.

The Rainforest Ravagers: International Forest Products Ltd. (Interfor), Western Forest Products, MacMillan Bloedel

Of the 353 rainforest valleys that once existed on the B.C. coast, 80% have either been logged or felt the impact of some other form of human development. Most of the remaining undeveloped valleys can be found in the Great Bear Rainforest (Greenpeace Canada, 1998a, p. 3).

On the central and north coasts, dubbed the Great Bear Rainforest by conservationist Ian McAllister, other forest companies were actively logging. The strategy had to be broadened

to include the entire rainforest coast, as well as to put pressure on all of the companies logging there. With the production of “Rainforest Ravagers,” a report detailing the activities of three companies (Western Forest Products, MacMillan Bloedel, and International Forest Products), Greenpeace broadened its targets. Greenpeace asked for:

- No logging in any of the remaining pristine rainforest valleys;
- No new roads in the temperate rainforest; and
- An immediate end to clearcutting.

With so much at stake for their profits, the companies refused to talk about decreasing their cut in this large expanse of forest. Greenpeace therefore geared up for further confrontation in the Great Bear Rainforest, and by 1997 everything was ready to go.

The Year of Confrontation — 1997

Greenpeace’s first strategy was to highlight the failure of the B.C. government to enforce the highly touted Forest Practices Code that had been first introduced in 1993 (following the summer of Clayoquot Sound) and made into law in 1995. Greenpeace released an explosive and damning report, “Broken Promises: The Truth About What’s Happening to British Columbia’s Forests” in the spring of 1997. The report unleashed the fury of the Premier of the province, Glen Clark, who called Greenpeace the “enemies of British Columbia.” Government officials, however, were unable to discredit the report’s contents. As they reported to the Premier a few days later, its facts were all obtained from the industry’s and the government’s own statistics.

Greenpeace’s second strategy was to turn to scientists for their assessment of the forest ecosystem and its ability to sustain the harvesting methods that were being practiced. Over the months and years of the campaign, hundreds of scientists backed the demand for more protection of these forests. The Conservation Areas Design, a document prepared by environmental groups and peer reviewed by independent scientists, highlighted the need for increased protection on the coast. This document added credibility in the marketplace as the campaign unfolded.

In April 1997, road building for logging operations in the pristine areas of the central coast began; so did the Greenpeace blockades. At the invitation of the First Nations people of the area, the Nuxalk, a blockade was set up on their sacred land on King Island to protest against the clearcut logging. Another blockade was set up in a region where the First Nations people there were not in support of the blockade.

Reaction, while slower due to the distances and inaccessibility of the area, was nevertheless strong. Almost three weeks into the blockade, 24 people, including First Nations people, were arrested and charged with contempt of court. Minutes following the arrest, another action occurred on the sea where Greenpeace occupied a huge barge carrying raw logs. On the same day, the Greenpeace International Executive Director addressed the United Nations General Assembly which was assessing the accomplishments of the last five years since the declaration of the 1992 Rio Summit on the Environment. As only one of two NGOs invited to address the General Assembly, Greenpeace used this occasion to highlight the continued clearcutting of the ancient temperate rainforests of B.C. It was a day of media saturation for Greenpeace, and a day of continuing negative international coverage for the

logging industry, as several of the activists arrested were from other countries. The story was carried in many countries, and as a result, the pressure on B.C. increased.

Other legal proceedings also occurred with two lawsuits filed against Greenpeace by the International Woodworkers of America (IWA), a union representing the loggers. The unions had had enough of work stoppages in the forests and charged Greenpeace with interruption of work, loss of wages and conspiracy.

On July 1, 1997, the IWA surrounded two Greenpeace ships in Vancouver harbour with a chain of logs, preventing them from departing. The media carried this story widely, although this time it was heavily against Greenpeace. It was portrayed as the organization that was trying to destroy the economy of B.C. and take workers' jobs away.

All of this media coverage kept the issue in the public eye, but in B.C. the public was tiring of confrontation and was becoming more critical of Greenpeace. While continuing with its strategy of keeping the pressure on the companies involved, Greenpeace decided to move more decisively into the marketplace and out of the woods.

Changing Markets: Rejecting the Chainsaw Products

MacMillan Bloedel Takes the Lead

MacMillan Bloedel's new President arrived in 1997 and immediately challenged his managers to come up with logging alternatives. He reviewed the work of the independent Science Panel on Clayoquot Sound that had recommended all stakeholders and the First Nations people in the Sound (Nuu-Chah-Nulth) must be part of the solution. He insisted on meeting with all those involved in the forest debate. Intensive rounds of behind-the-scenes meetings took place with First Nations, environmental groups, unions, government officials and other forest companies.

By the summer of 1998, MacMillan Bloedel announced its intention to phase out clearcutting over the next five years and replace it with variable-retention logging — a major victory for the environmentalists. Greenpeace campaigners arrived at the press conference with a bottle of well-aged champagne to celebrate the announcement and to congratulate MacMillan Bloedel. The media loved it — the two protagonists shaking hands! Almost a year and a half later, in a reflective piece in the Canadian Business section of the *Globe and Mail* on the work being done to make this change, MacMillan Bloedel acknowledged that:

the new method must be conducted in ways sensitive to public opinion, which counts for so much in the company's radical change. Indeed public — and market — opinion is what this change is all about. MacMillan Bloedel has been struggling financially in recent years and at war with environmental groups over cutting old growth (never before logged) forests. It made its decision about clearcuts after feeling the heat from those groups and after fretting over bottom-line worries, such as boycott threats from international clients who can click onto the Internet and view pictures of unsightly clearcuts to be dissuaded from buying its products" (*Globe and Mail*, October 12, 1999).

The company also entered a joint forestry venture with the region's Nuu-Chah-Nulth First Nation and transferred its entire cutting rights in that area to that venture, Iisaak. Iisaak would not log in pristine watersheds, and would use selective low-impact logging elsewhere.

Pressure from the US Markets

The United States became the next key focus of the markets strategy, and years of work with several key environmental groups there (especially the Rainforest Action Network) paid off. Greenpeace joined with them in information pickets at outlets of Home Depot (the largest single lumber retailer in the world), and supported a shareholder resolution at its Annual Meeting in 1998. By August 1999, Home Depot announced that it would stop selling wood from environmentally endangered areas. The President and CEO of the company, Arthur Blank, said, "This is not in response to ... any extreme group. It's in response to our opportunities, and moreover our responsibilities, in this regard." Michael Brune of the Rainforest Action Network said, "Home Depot is a linchpin in the industry, and if they are truly phasing out old-growth wood, I could not possibly overstate the importance of this victory" (Globe and Mail, August 27, 1999, p. B7).

On January 22, 2000, a major article in the Canadian Business section of the Globe and Mail entitled, "US environmentalists swing axe at Canadian forest industry," discussed the escalation of the market campaign in the US marketplace. The article quoted a B.C. lumber industry source as admitting, "It's very hard to fight it from here when the battle is being waged in New York, L.A. and Atlanta ... It's serious and to a large extent, it's out of our control." The journalist, Barrie McKenna, continued, "That's why Canadian forestry companies are eager to bring the focus of the debate back home, where they believe science and the facts are on their side"(Globe and Mail, January 22, 2000).

Expansion in Europe

Following the previous successful work in 1994-95 convincing European companies to raise serious questions about their contracts with B.C. wood suppliers, work in Europe focused on Swedish home furnishings retailer IKEA, a company with whom Greenpeace had worked on other environmental issues. By late November 1999, IKEA and Greenpeace made a joint announcement that IKEA was phasing out all purchases made from unknown wood sources, and that the only time it would use ancient forest wood would be if the Forest Stewardship Council certified it. IKEA receives almost a third of its wood products from British Columbia and the IKEA spokesperson indicated that all of its B.C. suppliers had agreed to comply with the policy. The policy, requiring considerable audit work within the company, would take effect in September 2000.

Stakeholder Consultations

Various forest company spokespersons were acknowledging openly that the markets campaign was having a considerable impact on their business and on their future plans. This meant that the companies had to come to the negotiation table prepared for serious work. Various consultations to address the issues included the provincial government-sponsored Land Resources Management Plan for the Central Coast, the consultation among coastal

First Nations people facilitated by the David Suzuki Foundation, and the Joint Solutions Project bringing together ENGOs and logging companies.

By mid-2000 the talks between the ENGOs and logging companies led to a significant agreement. Under this agreement, ENGOs would halt their international campaigns against the four signatory companies (Weyerhaeuser, which had bought out MacMillan Bloedel; Western Forest Products; Canadian Forest Products; and Fletcher Challenge Canada) in return for a promise from the companies not to log in 30 sensitive areas in the pristine rainforest. There was also agreement to develop a conservation-based ecosystem approach to the region's entire seven million hectares. The ENGOs included Greenpeace, the Coastal Rainforest Coalition (later renamed ForestEthics), the Rainforest Action Network, and the Sierra Club of British Columbia.

However significant the agreement, there was a snag. Two forest companies that had been part of the consultations had withdrawn just prior to the agreement. West Fraser Timber withdrew after reaching a deal with another company to take over its tenure rights, therefore rendering meaningless its earlier signals of willingness to have its tenures a part of the agreement. International Forests Products Ltd. (Interfor), with the largest share of logging rights in the rainforest, determined that it would seek its own solutions. Its withdrawal presented a major challenge for the Greenpeace market campaign. How could a deal be meaningful for the central and north coasts without the commitment of this large company? Greenpeace vowed it would continue the market pressure on these companies, and on Interfor in particular. Interfor's chief forester, Ric Slaco, said it was willing to risk being targeted by the environmentalists (Globe and Mail, July 29, 2000).

The Final Push — Interfor

Interfor was already well known to Greenpeace as one of the forest ravagers it had documented in its previous report. Greenpeace knew that Interfor was intensifying its logging operations in the Great Bear Rainforest and had plans to move into valleys that had not been previously logged. It was concerned about Interfor's continued logging in Clayoquot Sound. It also knew that most of Interfor's products were for the export market to Japan and the United States, almost exclusively in the form of lumber.

Greenpeace prepared for what it hoped would be a final push. Its objectives for this push were:

- Use international markets pressure to force Interfor and to a lesser degree West Fraser Timber into placing the intact rainforest valleys in their tenures into a moratorium; and
- Convince the companies to support the development of a conservation based plan that protects the health of Canada's coastal rainforest.

Intensive research on Interfor's markets all over the world and Interfor's mutual fund and institutional investors gave Greenpeace the facts on which to move forward. Among the critical pieces of information that Greenpeace discovered was that the two largest Interfor customers were Norske Skog Canada (which had purchased Fletcher Challenge Canada) and Canadian Forests Products, both of which had signed the agreement. When Greenpeace indicated it would pursue its market work against Interfor, including all its customers, these two countered that Greenpeace could not blame them for what Interfor did in the rainforests. Greenpeace insisted that the same strategies used with Home Depot and IKEA

applied to Canadian consumers and said it would continue the campaign. Because of this, Greenpeace was kicked out of ongoing industry/ENGO consultations by the remaining forest companies.

Japan and the Rest of the World

The markets work broadened to Japan where Greenpeace documented the importing of Interfor forest products by Japanese companies. Greenpeace Japan's correspondence with these companies was convincing enough to elicit commitments from more than 70 companies, including Mitsubishi and Fujiya, to stop buying products from Interfor. This played a huge role in Interfor's increasing understanding of what the Greenpeace market work could do. Protests and other campaign actions were carried out in Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand, China and Japan. Blockades of wood shipments, protests at embassies, retail outlets and lumber yards, and back room discussions with customers of the B.C. companies, were used to persuade investors and customers to demand an end to the destruction. By the spring of 2001, Interfor contacted Greenpeace to talk.

The results of those talks led to the announcement referred to at the beginning of this paper. That announcement was the final victory in an intense and hard-fought campaign for the forests. The Governments of British Columbia and of First Nations endorsed the agreement to protect Canada's remaining coastal rainforest that had been forged by Greenpeace, other ENGOs, logging companies, forest workers, community representatives, fishers, marine conservationists and small business and tourism operators.

The agreement includes:

- Protection: 20 large pristine rainforest valleys will be protected from industrial logging and development;
- Moratoria: 69 large valleys will be designated as "option areas" with no logging allowed for the next 12-24 months until an independent committee of scientists decides what logging, if any, can take place;
- A government-to-government protocol with six First Nations, ensuring that systems of ecosystem-based management will form the basis for future land use plans in their traditional territories;
- A multi-party process to lead to further protection as well as ecologically responsible logging practices;
- Bilateral agreements (between ENGOs and B.C.'s major coastal companies) will lead to voluntary moratoria on some critical valleys outside of the Great Bear Rainforest and the processes to move these to resolution.

Greenpeace has agreed to suspend its international markets campaign and has hailed this as a "first step" toward the long-term conservation and protection of some of last remaining intact ancient forests on B.C.'s coast.

Markets of the Future: Towards Ecoforestry and Certification

Throughout this entire campaign, Greenpeace has also worked on alternatives to the destructive logging practices (ecoforestry), and alternatives for the marketplace (eco-

certification). It has done this, conscious of the fact that the industrial consumers with whom they were speaking were serious about avoiding products from clearcut forests and equally serious about finding alternatives.

In November 1995 Greenpeace Canada supported the launch of Canada's very first eco-certified logging operation. As described in the pamphlet *Eco-Certification in the Forest Industry: A revolution in the marketplace*:

The logging program that achieved certification was developed by staff from the Small Business Enterprise Program near Vernon, British Columbia, using single-tree selection logging with small-scale equipment, employing more people than by mechanized clearcutting operations. After logging, 70 percent of the forest remained standing.

A buyers group, the first in the world, was formed in the UK in 1994 and consisted of retailers who were being asked for eco-guarantees by their customers. This buyers group committed to preferentially buy wood products that had been certified by the Forest Stewardship Council, an independent international forestry certification and labelling system that had been created to fill the gap being identified on the world market.

Many other companies have followed suit, demanding certified wood products. Several certification schemes have arisen in response to this, and there is understandable concern that some of these, forest-industry-sponsored, may lead to eco-labels being given to practices and companies that should not receive them.

The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) was set up to address this call from retailers and to fill an institutional gap in independent forest certifications schemes. Based in Mexico, its membership is made up of economic, social, indigenous, and ecological interest groups. Greenpeace International is one among several hundred members and supports the rigorous performance-based criteria used by the FSC.

Certification is a process by which an independent audit is conducted of a forestry business to assess whether it meets internationally recognized guidelines of responsible forest management that protect the ecological integrity of the forest and respect the rights of workers, local communities and indigenous peoples. Companies passing the certification assessment are eligible to have their products sold with an eco-logo, which tells customers that the product they are buying comes from a well-managed forest. (Greenpeace Canada, 1998b).

In July 2001, the Iisaak Joint Venture in Clayoquot Sound in British Columbia became the first large-scale forest operation in B.C. to receive this certification.

We have come a long way since Clayoquot Summer of 1993!

Learning from the Campaign

What might be learned from this campaign that would be helpful to advocacy efforts in future? My reflections include the following:

1. A very broad and visionary long-term goal was essential. However, shorter-term objectives had to be achievable, and the strategies to meet these objectives had to change to respond to the developing circumstances. It was essential to be very flexible with the

tactics for carrying out the strategies, as things changed on the ground, as unexpected developments occurred, as difficulties in alliances developed, as the public mood shifted, and as resources (both financial and personnel) increased and/or diminished.

2. An early understanding that the international marketplace was the only place in which to win this campaign was key in focusing all the campaign actors and actions. The forest companies understood the bottom line, and had to listen to their consumers and to their shareholders. The fact that the marketplace shifted dramatically in such a short time (the agreement on the Great Bear Rainforest took only four years since the inception of the major thrust on the central and north coasts) forced the companies to reconsider their way of doing business and to come to an agreement to make substantial and significant changes in the forests.
3. Strategic alliances were critical on a number of fronts — with First Nations in each region of the rainforest, with the public (Greenpeace supporters and the broader public), with and between all Greenpeace offices, with other ENGOs, with scientists, conservation and marine biologists, and with representatives of unions. Some of these alliances were more difficult to maintain than others; some broke down at various points, requiring new and determined energy and almost constant communications; some required more strategic thought than was put into them; and some never fully developed, and maybe could never have developed, even with more work. The interaction of all of these was not fully understood from the beginning, but evaluation and learning took place along the way. This constant evaluation and attention to the intricacies of these alliances and to the role that each member played in the overall campaign was a key factor in ultimate victory.
4. Victories along the way were recognized, acknowledged, and celebrated. With each incremental victory, the dynamics of the campaign changed and time had to be taken to understand and analyze how the campaign should change to acknowledge these. The commitment to continue and intensify the pressure on the companies, even when some incremental victories had been achieved, led to a substantial change in the marketplace in a relatively short period of time.
5. A critical vulnerability for the environmentalists lay in the perception of forest industry workers and their families that the environmentalists cared nothing for people or for their ability to support their families. While some unions ascribed to a longer-term view of forest AND economic (i.e. job) sustainability, one large union did not. This led to public and legal challenges to Greenpeace's campaign and to personal attacks and death threats toward environmentalists. More advance work on economic alternatives and more attempts to dialogue with particular unions ahead of the campaign may have averted some of the attack, although that is not certain, given the intricacies of the relationships of the unions with the companies. The learning for future campaigns is that the concerns of workers must be seriously addressed in all campaign planning.
6. More strategic anticipation of attacks from industry and government could have benefited Greenpeace considerably. Too much time was taken in countering the attacks, some of which were quite unexpected. Greenpeace had to learn how to withstand and/or respond to major and virulent public attack, especially related to its daring intervention in the marketplace, which the industry and government considered

unacceptable from a non-governmental organization. The large public relations campaign to discredit Greenpeace ranged from charges of “misinformation” to “Greenpeace as the destroyer of the British Columbia economy” to “Greenpeace as enemies of British Columbia” to “Greenpeace organization is in serious financial collapse.” All of these required carefully nuanced responses always based on facts.

7. Keeping the campaign focused on the facts as stated by government and industry reports and by scientific research was crucial to the success of the campaign.

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